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Abstract
In this paper we ground the asymmetry of causal relations in the internal physical states
of a special kind of open dissipative physical system, a causal agent. A causal agent is an
autonomous physical system, maintained far from equilibrium by a low entropy source of
energy, with accurate sensors and actuators. It has a memory to record sensor measure-
ments and actuator operations. It contains a learning system that can access the sensor and
actuator records to learn and represent the causal relations. We claim that causal relations
are relations between the internal sensor and actuator records and the causal concept inher-
ent in these correlations is then inscribed in the physical dynamics of the internal learning
machine. The existence of contingent internal memory states means each causal agent is
in a different physical state. We argue that it is this sense that causal relations are per-
spectival. From the outside, averaging over internal states, the causal agents are identical
thermodynamic systems.
1 Introduction
Is causation in the external, physical world or in our heads? Russell [1] famously denied the
former while the latter seems unacceptably subjective. The current interventionist [2, 3] account
of causation, viewed as a perspectival account [4], seems to be somewhere in between, “an
irenic third way” in the words of Price [5]. We will demonstrate that causal claims depend for
their truth on the internal physical states of a special kind of machine, a causal agent. This
will enable us to defend a perspectival view of causation that is not anthropocentric, and is
dependent on the laws of physics, especially thermodynamics. Our objective is to give empirical
support to Price’s “causal viewpoint” as “a distinctive mix of knowledge, ignorance and practical
ability that a creature must apparently exemplify, if it is to be capable of employing causal
concepts.” [5]. In Cartwright’s terms, we physically ‘ground the distinction between effective
strategies and ineffective ones” [6]. As Ismael writes “Causes appear in mature science not as
necessary connections written into the fabric of nature, but robust pathways that can be utilized
as strategic routes to bringing about ends.”[7]. We seek these ‘robust pathways’ in the physical
structure of learning machines.
One aim is to relieve the apparent tension between our usual understanding of causation and
our best theories of fundamental physics. At heart, our position rests on a kind of fundamentalism
about “open systems physics”. In doing so, we answer Russell’s criticism and put causation firmly
back on physical ground. A second aim is to provide a concrete, physically realistic, minimal
model of a causal agent as a special kind of machine. This provides a framework from which
to consider philosophical questions pertinent to agential theories of causation. Our aims are
circumscribed by what we can be grounded in physical reasoning. Whether we should think of
causal asymmetry as stemming from free will or intention, or whether a human agent exceeds or
is bounded by the features of our minimal model, we leave open.
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We take it as given that causal concepts find no application in the fundamental physics of
closed systems. This is Russell’s view. A system is closed if it cannot interact with anything
outside itself. Possibly the only truly closed system is the universe itself. There may be other
closed systems but the quantum theory of measurement tells us we cannot know anything about
them, as all observed quantum systems are necessarily open and this cannot be made negligible
due to decoherence. Even without resorting to quantum theory, classical physics tells us that
when we take general relativity into account there is no closed system other than the universe
itself. This is simply a consequence of the fact that the gravitational interaction cannot be
screened. We will henceforth regard spatially restricted closed systems as irrelevant to our
discussion. We consider partially open sub-systems of the universe, and the interactions between
them. It is our contention that casual relations can only be understood in terms of open systems.
What then of fundamental physics? The time symmetric dynamical laws of physics enable us
to say, to a high degree of accuracy, what will happen in partially open systems, the prototypical
example of which is called an experiment. Furthermore, the laws themselves define what we mean
by a partially open system by specifying the relevant scale of interactions between subsystems.
For example, when we observe the elastic collision between two laboratory scale objects we assume
that the gravitational effect of the sun can be ignored as the gravitational constant appearing
in Newton’s law is very small compared to the internal electrical forces ultimately responsible
for the interaction. This assumption is vindicated by the high degree to which momentum is
conserved in the collision. A system is partially open if its internal interactions are much stronger
than any interactions with systems external to it. Of course, this is dependent on experimental
accuracy and the time-scale of the experiment: in the long run even small interactions matter.
We are mainly going to talk about a special kind of open system: one that makes measure-
ments upon its environment via sensors and then acts upon that environment via actuators in
ways that depend on the measurement results [8]. As we will discuss, there is a key thermody-
namic asymmetry between sensors and actuators: actuators do work on the world but the world
does work on the sensors.
The argument we make here is summarised as follows. In closed classical and quantum
systems, causal relations are irrelevant just as Russell has argued. Russell’s argument does not
apply to open subsystems of the universe (with boundaries defined by good physical arguments)
as open subsystems are described by irreversible dynamics. Given a boundary there are two
ways to describe an open subsystem: from the inside with access to all internal states and from
the outside with access to only external states and coarse grained descriptions of the subsystem
There is a special class of open subsystems called causal agents. A causal agent (CA) is an
open system maintained in a non equilibrium steady state stabilized by access to an external low
entropy source of energy and that contains specialised subsystems; sensors, actuators, memories,
and a learning machine. Causal relations correspond to relations between internal actuator and
sensor records as represented by the states of the internal learning machine. These are objective
states from the internal perspective of the CA. From an external perspective (the thermodynamic
perspective) the internal records are unknown and the description is given in terms of a coarse
grained interaction between a subsystem driven far from equilibrium interacting with the world
around it: causal relations play no role in this description, only thermodynamics. All CAs require
access to a source of free energy to function. Thus they can only arise in a universe that is not
in thermal equilibrium.
In section 2 we give a definition of a causal agent. In section 3 we discuss a very simple classical
dynamical model of a causal agent and illustrate the distinction between the inside/outside view
of a causal agent that is central to our argument. In section 4 we discuss the thermodynamics of
sensors and actuators and the fundamental asymmetry between them. In section 5 we introduce
the concept of a learning system as an irreversible physical system coupled by feedback to the
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sensors and actuators and give a simple example of how a learning system can embody causal
concepts. In section 6 we discuss the thermodynamic constraints on learning systems. In section
7 we summarise our conclusions and compare our argument with other philosophical discussions
of causation.
2 Minimal Causal Agents.
We now define a causal agent (CA) as a special kind of open physical system interacting with
its environment. A causal agent has at least the following features;
1. it is open, finite and localised in space and time,
2. it can persist in one or more non equilibrium stable steady states which are stabilised by
access to a low entropy source of energy.
3. it has sensors the physical state of which is changed by the world external to it (a mea-
surement in other words),
4. it has actuators capable of changing physical states in the external world,
5. it has a memory capable of storing the record of sensor readings ( sensations) and actuator
settings (actions),
6. it has a learning component implemented by dissipative physical systems (digital or ana-
logue) that enable the CA to represent the correlations inherent in the sensor and actuator
records via the dynamical states of the learning system itself.
The first and second of these features is intended to emphasize that a CA is an open subsystem
that interacts only with its local environment subject to the usual constraints of relativity. That
is to say, only physical events in the past and future light cones of the CA are relevant for
describing its behaviour. That a CA is finite implies that the available resources (eg. energy,
time) are restricted. The spatio-temporal boundary that delimits the causal agent from the rest
of the world is the fundamental origin of the asymmetry between cause and effect. The sensors,
actuators, memories and learning can only operate with low error probability if the machine has
access to a low entropy source of energy. The reason for this is analogous to the resolution of the
Maxwell demon argument[9]. All measurements are subject to noise. A measurement is accurate
only if the sensor has lower entropy than the unknown state of the system it is monitoring.
Similarly, an actuator that is in thermal equilibrium with the world it is attempting to control
does not work.
The third of these features captures the key point that the CA can make measurements
of a finite set of physical quantities in its environment. Such measurements are mediated by
local physical interactions between the CA and matter/fields in its local environment. For
example, it may make measurements of the position and velocity of nearby particles by emitting
optical photons and absorbing the scattered light from the particles. Or it may measure the
thermodynamic state (pressure, temperature, etc) of external subsystems. These measurements
are described by the known physical interactions between parts of the CA and the external world.
These interactions are irreversible in the sense that the world changes the thermodynamic state
of the sensors. Crucially, the measurement records are random variables (i.e. subject to noise
and error) that ultimately arise from thermodynamic constraints.
The fourth feature enables the CA to apply forces and do work, or other thermodynamic
transformations, on subsystems in the external world. It may use local electrical circuits to
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apply electromagnetic forces to do work on external subsystems; it may emit radiation to directly
heat external subsystems; it may simply act with mechanical elements (levers, hammers etc. ).
Like measurements, these actions are subject to noise and error arising from thermodynamic
constraints.
The fifth feature is critical to the definition of a CA. It must contain a finite memory to record
both measurements (from sensors) and actions (of its actuators). These records are stochastic
internal records by which a contingent history of its experience in the world is represented by
changes in its internal physical state. The stochastic nature of measurement results distinguish
the physical state of one CA from another of identical construction acting in an identical envi-
ronment: the probability that two distinct CAs contain identical records is very small. In this
respect each CA is unique. The records stored in memory may be said to encode the internal
perspective of an individual CA. We have stipulated that memories are finite. This means that a
mechanism must be exist to restore the systems implementing a memory to a single fixed state.
For example if the memory is very small it will need to be reset for continued use[9]. In any
case the memory needs to be initialised in a known (low entropy) state in order to reliably store
information and they must be subject to very little noise or, if not, capable of being reset using
error correction which requires a low entropy source[8].
The sixth feature enables a CA to act contingently in a way that reflects how sensations deter-
mine actions. This could be via a deterministic, or hard wired, ’reflex’ connecting measurement
to actions (as in a simple thermostat). Alternatively, the rules might be based on an internal
look-up table from measurement records to appropriate actions. We will assume that the CA has
an internal learning machine of some sort. This may fall short of the universal computational
capability of a modern digital computer: Possibly a set of special-purpose sophisticated analogue
computers may suffice. In any case, the learning machine is capable of physically representing
the correlations between sensor and actuator records.
The last feature implies that the CAs have an additional, rather subtle feature: an internal
mechanism to enable it to sequence actions conditioned on measurement results. It might be
as simple as a mechanism to ensure that actions occur after measurements. Perhaps as soon as
a bit is switched from zero to one in memory, an action is triggered. Of course this assumes a
fundamental asymmetry between sensors and actuators. In our model they are distinguished by
the thermodynamic processes they experience: the world does work on sensors but the actuators
do work on the world; they are built that way. We stress that the CA need not be synchronized
to any external clock or directly signal its internal state to the external world. For a CA, time is a
purely local and perspectival feature. The passing of time is reflected in the gradual accumulation
(or erasure) of memory records.
In the rest of this paper we will simply assume that machines exhibiting all these features
either currently exist or can be built. Our objective is to show that CAs of this kind can best
be described using causal relations grounded on their internal memory records. The behaviour
of a CA is exhaustively described in terms of learned relationships between the records stored
in memory. The CA discovers and represents these relationships through its internal learning
capability. If an external observer does not have access to these internal records (the standard
thermodynamic assumption), the behaviour of the machine cannot be described using causal
relations. Rather, its behaviour is described using the physical theory of open systems (statistical
mechanics, thermodynamics etc).
It is possible that animals exhibit some or all of the features of a CA as we have defined
them. If they do, clearly they contain much more besides. For example, we do not discuss how
a CA draws upon a low entropy source of energy, how it maintains itself in a metastable state
in a changing environment state or weather it is artificially engineered, self assembled machine
or reproducing.
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Our construction of a causal agent has considerable overlap with similar constructs by other
authors. The importance of sensors and actuators for artificial agents is a staple of textbooks
on artificial intelligence[13] that provide the raw data for learning algorithms. Briegel[14] also
stresses the importance of sensors and actuators for embodied agents. His novel concept of
‘projective simulations’ plays the role of a learning machine in our model. He emphasises the role
of stochasticity for creative learning agents and possible quantum enhancements. In elucidating
his concept of action based semantics Floridi[15] describing a two-machine artificial agent (AA).
This enabled the relationship between the internal states of the AA to play the role of ‘semantic-
inducing resources’ for what would otherwise be raw bit strings without resorting to an external
semantic crutch. The ‘two machines’ of his scheme roughly correspond to the actuator/sensor
machines and the learning machine in our model.
3 A simple physical model.
3.1 The external perspective.
Consider the thermodynamic system shown in Fig.(1). A local system, the ‘source’, can emit
particles of variable kinetic energy. It is driven by work done from a power supply towards a
steady state with its local environment at temperature Ts. The particles travel towards a small
potential hill. If they have enough kinetic energy, they can surmount the hill and never return to
the source. If they do not have sufficient kinetic energy they will be reflected from the potential
hill and return to the source. We will assume that the motion of the particles once they leave the
source is entirely conservative, that is to say, particles move without friction. As particles that
surmount the barrier are lost, we will assume that the source is supplied by a particle reservoir
such that the average particle number of the source is constant in time. But to make very sure
that particles with sufficient energy to surmount the barrier do not encounter a yet higher barrier
we will add a particle absorber to the right of the potential hill. Overall, this entire physical
arrangement is an irreversible system. See Fig. (1).
E
dW
dQ
Ts
heat/particle source
e- e+e-
absorber
dN
power
source
Figure 1: The external perspective. The system on the left, the source, is connected to a source
of work (increment dW ) and also a thermal/particle reservoir (increments dQ, dN respectively).
When the work done on the source is zero it is in thermal equilibrium and simply heats a distant
absorber. By doing work on the source we can bias it to emit predominantly low energy particles
and reduce the heating rate of the absorber.
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To begin we will assume no work is done on the particle source. Suppose the source initially
emits particles which can take one of two possible values of kinetic energy (e−, e+), with equal
probability, such that e− < E as e+ > E. All particles that have energy e+ are absorbed at
the right thereby raising the internal energy of the absorber. All particles that have energy
e− < E are returned to the system and absorbed. The system has access to an environment that
emits/absorbs particles locally to keep the average particle number and average energy constant.
The entropy of the source is one bit in natural units and its average energy (e− + e+)/2. The
average energy of the absorber is steadily increasing as it absorbs particles from the source. This
energy is heat extracted form the environment of the source. From the external perspective
the source is simply a source of heat as far as the absorber is concerned: it is not in thermal
equilibrium.
Now suppose that external work is done on the particle source so that it is driven away from
its initial thermal equilibrium to a new non equilibrium steady state such that the probability
distribution {p−, p+} changes such that p− >> p+. From this external perspective, it appears
that the thermodynamic state of the source has changed: it has lower entropy and lower average
energy. Now far fewer particles make it over the barrier and the rate of change of energy in the
absorber decreases. From this perspective the physical interpretation is clear: the environment of
the source (i.e. its local reservoir of heat and particles) is driving its entropy lower and lowering
the emitted power. Ultimately the entropy of the source environment must increase to satisfy
the second law.
Let us summarise. By definition, the external perspective assumes that the internal states
of the CA are unknown. Only a coarse grained thermodynamic state is known. All similar CAs
have the same thermodynamic description.
3.2 The internal perspective.
Let us now imagine how this looks from the internal perspective of the source, if we assume it
is a CA. This is depicted in Fig.(2). The actuator records now track the energy of an emitted
particle: recording a 1 if an e− particle was emitted and a 0 if an e+ particle was emitted. The
sensor records track if a particle was received back: recording a 0 if no particle is received back
and a 1 if a particle is received back. The CA has access to a (classical) learning machine that
rewards a sensor record of 1, that is to say, it gets a reward if an emitted particle is received
back. Of course in reality both actuators and sensors have a small error probability so that the
record does not exactly match what actually happened in the actuator and sensor devices.
Initially the actuator emits particles with energy e± with equal probability. The CA can now
learn that there is a causal correlation between emitting an e− particle and receiving a particle.
Using its access to an external source of power it then begins to shift the distribution of the
energy of emitted particles such that its actuator record is composed entirely of 1s. Due to
physical errors this does not mean that every emitted particle had an energy e−. That would be
an unphysical state of zero entropy. However, for an effective learning strategy the sensor record
is composed overwhelmingly of 1s provided the power source has sufficiently low entropy (i.e.
high free energy). Note that in the steady-state the entropy of the CA has decreased. This is a
necessary feature of all CAs that learn[16].
From this internal perspective the CA has learned something about the outside world; the
existence of the potential energy bump with an energy hill greater than e− and this is represented
in the steady-state operation of the learning machine. This is a kind of measurement and its
accuracy depends on how low an error rate can be achieved in the sensors and actuators, that
is to say, how low an entropy is associated with their records. From an internal thermodynamic
perspective, the entropy of the records has been reduced by the learning machine. Learning
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Figure 2: The internal perspective. The same system as described in Fig.(1) but for which we
have access to its contingent internal states representing actuator and sensor records.
machines (at least classical learning machines) necessarily reduce entropy and thus must be
supplied by a source of free energy.
The internal records of the CA are completely contingent. As the actuator/sensor records
are random binary strings every CA will, almost certainly, have different records. The physical
internal states of each CA is unique but, from the external perspective the internal records are
unknown (by definition), and every CA of this type behaves as an identical thermodynamic
machine.
This simple example may be given a quantum description but this requires that the CA
intrinsically uncertainty. Firstly we cannot use states of definite energy as such states are not
localised in space. We must use wave-packet states that are localised in position and momentum.
Secondly such states are dispersive under free evolution. That is to say Schroedinger evolution
leads to wave packet spreading. Even if the average energy of the state is less than the barrier
height, it can still pass the barrier by quantum tunnelling. Likewise even if the average energy
of the wave-packet state is greater than the barrier it can still be reflected from the barrier. This
leads to a necessary uncertainty in sensor and actuator records.
There is difference for the quantum description that is more fundamental if we demand that
both sensor and actuator records are classical numbers. In the case of the sensor this means that
whatever system is acting as a sensor must make a position measurement on reflected states if it
is to record their return to the agent. This requires decoherence and thus the sensor is necessarily
an open system. Furthermore the results of such a measurement are intrinsically uncertain. The
situation is quite similar for the actuators which must be controlled by a classical binary digit.
Classical control of this kind also requires decoherence[17]. We thus see that randomness and
decoherence enter the quantum description in an essential way.
This is true for all agents that use quantum states but retain classical records in their sensors
and actuators. It is certainly possible for agents to use purely quantum sensors and actuators,
for example by using coherent control (known as cascaded system theory in quantum optics[18]).
This is a uniquely quantum mode of operation but it is far from clear how one could incorporate
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learning into such a scenario.
4 Thermodynamic constraints on sensors and actuators.
This simple example illustrates the conditions for the sensors and actuators to operate in a way
that enables a CA to work. We will now capture these constraints in a more abstract form. It is
clear that there must be a physical asymmetry between the behaviour of sensors and actuators.
Actuators act on the world by changing the thermodynamic state of some part of it. Sensors on
the other hand are acted upon by some part of the world so that their thermodynamic state is
changed.
Work done on/by a system is constrained by the change in the free energy(Helmholtz1). The
key relation is W ≤ −∆F , the average work extracted from a system must be less than the
decrease in free energy and if work is done on the system the free energy increases. Physical
changes to the sensors increase the free energy of the CA while actuators decrease the free energy
of the CA. See Fig.(3). These thermodynamic asymmetries must be built into the physical
construction of sensors and actuators.
Average work, and corresponding changes in free energy, are part of the external description
of how the thermodynamic state of a system changes. To describe the process from the internal
view we make use of the Jarzynski equality[11]. From this perspective, work is a random variable
conditioned on contingent physical processes inside the agent.
From the internal perspective of a CA, a time series record is kept of whether a sensor or
actuator ‘triggered’ or not in each time step. This record can be represented by a binary string
A = {01100101 . . .}, S = {11010100 . . .} of arbitrary (but finite) length where 1 indicates the
action/sensation did take place and 0 that it did not. This is depicted schematically in Fig.(3).
These records may not be faithful representations of what actual physical events took place:
Both sensors and actuators are subject to noise and may fail to have done what the record
indicates. This may seem a simple practical constraint but in fact it is fundamental consequence
of the second law which prevents a finite system from achieving a zero entropy state and an error
free state has zero entropy. In physical terms it means that both sensors and actuators are open
systems subject to environmental sources of noise. In the classical case this noise is thermal and
turns off at zero temperature. In the quantum case there can be noise even at zero temperature
due to spontaneous emission.
Let us assume for simplicity that both actuator and sensors have only two physically distin-
guishable states labeled by a binary variable x = 0, 1 such that the energies of each state Ex are
such that E0 < E1. We assume that, in the absence of actions and sensations, each system is
highly likely to be found in an initial ‘ready’ state. In the case of a sensor the ready state is the
lower energy state and in the case of an actuator ready state is the high energy state.
In order to incorporate errors and noise we will assume that the system representing a sensor
or an actuator is coupled to an environment such that the physical state fluctuates and thus x(t)
is a stochastic variable. Let px be the occupation probability of each state (p0 + p1 = 1). In the
absence of internal (actions) or external (sensations) inputs, the occupation probability for each
state is the stationary solution to the birth-death master equations of the form
dp0
dt
= −γ1p0 + γ0p1 = −dp1
dt
(1)
where γ1 corresponds to a transition 0 → 1 and γ0 corresponds to the transition 1 → 0. The
1We choose the Helmholtz free energy as we focus on electro-mechanical systems. Were one describing a causal
agent based on biology or chemistry the Gibss free energy would be more appropriate
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Figure 3: Schematic of the interaction between a causal agent with a system external to it. The
binary string X is a record of actions. The binary string Y is a record of sensations. The work
done by the actuator device on the external system is WA. The work done by the external sensor
on the sensor device is WS . The change in free energy of the actuator is ∆FA and the net change
in free energy of the external system is ∆Fe. The mutual information between the actuator
record and the sensor record, I(X;Y ), is a measure of the correlation between the two. The
causal relation between them is encoded in the physical states of the learning machine that acts
as a complex feedback control from sensors to actuators.
corresponding stationary distributions are then given by
p1(∞)
p0(∞) =
γ1
γ0
(2)
The conditions that distinguish the quiescent state sensors and actuators (the ‘ready’ state for
sensations and action) are
γ1 < γ0 sensor (3)
γ1 > γ0 actuator (4)
In the case of a sensor, prior to a sensation, it is more likely to be found in the lower energy
state x = 0 than the higher energy state x = 1. In the case of an actuator, prior to an action,
it is more likely to be found in the higher energy state x = 1 than the low energy state x = 0.
This is illustrated in Fig.(4).
It is important to stress however that neither the sensor nor the actuator are in thermal
equilibrium. They are in non equilibrium steady states due to external driving of a dissipative
system, the causal agent as a whole. In classical physics the rates γ0,1 go to zero as the tem-
perature goes to zero however in the quantum case they may not go to zero due to dissipative
quantum tunnelling (as in optical bistability for example [10]). This simple two state birth-death
master equation model can describe both classical and quantum sensors and actuators.
It will be important for later discussion to note what happens under time reversal of the
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Figure 4: The typical quiescent state (the ‘ready’ state) stochastic dynamics of the energy (scaled
by E) for the two-state system. (A) Sensor case, γ1/γ0 = 0.1 (B) Actuator case., γ1/γ0 = 10.0.
Shaded regions indicate those time intervals when the device has entered an error state.
master equation. In this case the role of γ0 and γ1 are switched. In other words, under time
reversal an actuator becomes a sensor and a sensor becomes an actuator.
These stationary distributions describe an ensemble of identical systems but an individual
system is certainly not stationary. In fact it is switching between the two states at rates de-
termined by γ0, γ1. The distinction between the ensemble states and the individual stochastic
states corresponds to the view from the outside and the view from the inside respectively. In a
long time average the ratio of the times spent in each state is given by the ratio of the transition
probabilities
τ1
τ0
=
γ1
γ0
(5)
in the limit that the total time τ1 + τ0 → ∞. Thus prior to actions and sensations, the sensor
spends more time in the lower energy state x = 0 while the actuator spends more time in the
higher energy state x = 1.
From the internal perspective, we need to describe the energy of a single system. In this
example x(t) is a stochastic process known as a random telegraph signal. Technically this means
that there are two Poisson processes dN(t)x where x = 0 or x = 1 that take values 0, 1 in a small
time interval t to t + dt. This means that in most small time intervals the state of the system
does not change but every now and then the system can jump from one state to the other. If a
jump does happen, one or the other of dN(t)x = 1 in the infinitesimal time interval t→ t+ dt.
The probability to take the value 1 in time interval dt is then simply
P (dNx(t) = 1; t+ dt, t) = E(dNx) = γxdt (6)
where E defines an ensemble average over many realisations. These equations imply that the
continuous record of the the state label x(t) satisfies the stochastic differential equation,
dx(t) = (1− x(t))dN+(t) + x(t)dN−(t) (7)
A simulation of this stochastic process is shown in Fig.(4). The internal states of other compo-
nents in the agent are responding to these fluctuating signals at all times. The agent is said to be
in a ready state or quiescent state if the time average of the signal corresponds to the stationary
states in Eq.(2).
We now need to describe how these devices respond to internal (actions) and external (sen-
sations) inputs. We will refer to these inputs as the control functions. First define
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Figure 5: The mean energy for a sensor (S) and actuator (A) as a function of . The bias values
for the quiescent states of each are indicated by 0. When internal and external control functions
act, the value of epsilon is changed to f = −0.
γ0 = γe
−/2 (8)
γ1 = γe
/2 (9)
If  is a constant the steady state average energy is
E [E] = E(1 + e±)−1 (10)
where − corresponds to an actuator and + corresponds to a sensor. This is shown in Fig.(5).
To set the devices to their quiescent state, a particular bias value 0 > 0 is chosen.
The control functions act to change the value of  in time from the quiescent state bias to
a final value f . The control functions push the devices away from their stationary state for a
short time, i.e. the occupation probabilities are changed, px → p′x. In the case of a sensor the
input comes from outside while for the case of an actuator the input comes from inside the CA.
This fundamental asymmetry requires a clear boundary between the agent and the world. Once
the control pulses have passed the sensors and actuators revert to their quiescent steady states.
As a simple example we will assume that the final value f is chosen to be the initial bias
values multiplied by minus one. Such a value of f simply swaps the steady state occupation
probability of the states.
From the inside view, this means that some control pulses induce a state change and some
do not. In other words, the change in the internal energy of the system is a stochastic variable
as is the work done by/on the external world, w. For example, in the case of a actuator, the
probability that the device remains in its quiescent state and does not change state as the control
function acts, is simply pe = (1+e
)−1. This is the error probability for the actuator. In this case
there are two possible values for the change in the energy of the system 0,−E with probability
distributions, Pr(0) = pe, P r(−E) = 1− pe. Thus in the case of an actuator, the work w done
by the system on the outside world is one of the two values 0,−E, fluctuating between the two
values from trial to trial. From the outside view, with this choice of f , the average entropy
of the sensor and actuators do not change while the sensor experiences an increase in average
energy and the actuator experiences a decrease in average energy.
The Jarzynski equality [11] is a relation between the ensemble averaged values of w over many
trials and the change in free energy corresponding to the two distributions px, p
′
x for systems in
contact with a heat bath. It thus relates the inside (stochastic) description to the thermodynamic
outside description. It is
E [e−βw] = e−β∆F (11)
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where β−1 = kBT and ∆F = ∆E − β∆S with E the average energy and S the average entropy
(in natural units) for each of the distributions px, p
′
x.
In our presentation there is no requirement for the sensors and actuators to be thermal
systems: they are maintained in arbitrary non equilibrium steady states. Nonetheless a Jaryznski
type equality holds (see [37]). We replace kBT with E as a convenient unit of energy and the
equality takes the form
E [e−w/E ] = e−∆F/E (12)
For the choice of f made here the change in free energy is simply the change in average internal
energy as the average entropy does not change. For a sensor the free energy increases by E and
for an actuator the free energy decreases by E when the control functions act. The relation in
Eq.(12) indicates that the world has done work on a sensor while an actuator does work on the
world.
Our treatment is entirely classical but can easily be extended to the quantum case. A model
for quantum enhanced sensors and actuators is discussed in [12]. In that study an example
is given for which the learning rate of a quantum enhanced agent in a noisy environment is
significantly better than the corresponding classical version.
Returning to the internal view, we note that we are not quite done yet. The agent needs to
record a binary digit to label if a control pulse was present or not in some interval of internal
time. In the case of a sensor this will write a record of sensation to memory. In the case of an
actuator this will write a record of an action to memory. There needs to be a physical process,
a switch, in the agent responding to the fluctuating energy states of the sensor/actuator and on
the basis of time spent in the high/low energy state, record a 1 if it is not in the expected steady
state or otherwise record a 0.
It is easy enough to devise physical systems that integrates the random telegraph signal
describing a particular stochastic history of sensors and actuators. The integrated signal can
then be used to switch a memory. We will give an example for sensors. The actuator case is
similar. For example, we could define a stochastic variable Z(t) that satisfies the stochastic
differential equation
dZ(t) = −κZ(t)dt+Adn(t) (13)
where κ,A are positive constants and dn(t) satisfies Eq. (7), the random telegraph process
corresponding to the continuous-time readout of the sensor/actuator state. In this example Z(t)
might be a voltage on a resistor driven by a current proportional to dn/dt It then follows that
for initial conditions pushed into the far past so that all transients have died out,
Z(t) = A
∫ t
−∞
dn(t′)e−κ(t−t
′) (14)
itself a stochastic process. The ensemble average of Z(t) is
E [z(t)] = Z¯ = A
κ
p1 (15)
Before an input pulse acts this is small but shortly after an input pulse it is large. We now let
the stochastic signal Z(t) drive a Bonhoeffer-van der Pol (BVP) neuronal oscillator [19]. This
is a dynamical system that has a stable fixed point, except for particular range of values of
the driving, Z(t), when the fixed point becomes unstable and a stable limit cycle forms. We
thus need to set up the BVP oscillator to switch to the limit cycle when the integrated value of
n(t) that determines Z(t) takes values appropriate to the limit cycle with high probability. The
appearance of the limit cycle is the record of the sensor/actuator record. Note that the limit
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cycle only appears after the input pulse to the sensor triggers a response and decays away as the
sensor returns to its steady state. This response can then be used to trigger further actions in
the agent such as learning or feedback control of the actuator.
5 Learning in a causal agent.
In our model the only data a CA has access to is the content of its sensor and actuator records. In
order to learn causal concepts we grant the machine some additional systems that can implement
learning based on this data. In this section, we consider some sufficient conditions required in
order for a machine to learn such relations.
We will assume the validity of the Church-Turing-Deutsch (CTD) principle. Nielsen[20] states
this as follows:
Every physical process can be simulated by a universal computing device.
We will take this to be the equivalent to the statement:
all sensor data acquired by the CA can be treated as the output of a Turing machine
which takes the actuator data as input. This is similar to Solomonoff induction[21].
The CTD principle is not to be confused with the Church-Turing thesis which is a meta-
mathematical statement about computable functions. The CTD principle is rather to be re-
garded as a physical principle much like the laws of thermodynamics. A good discussion on this
distinction can be found in [22]. Of course the CTD principle may simply be wrong. Ultimately
experimental evidence will decide the issue.
An important consequence of the CTD principle is that a suitably configured and sufficiently
complex subsystem of the universe can simulate the results of any physical experiment. In our
case this means that an agent can be any physical device with sufficient complexity to implement
a universal computer, possibly a quantum computer. Deutsch refers to this as a kind of universal
self-similarity[32].
Many attempts have been made to show that the physical world violates the CTD principle
and they continue unabated[23]. In many cases that have been analysed carefully one typically
finds an implicit assumption about the nature of physical resources that seems unphysical[24].
If the world does not satisfy the CTD principle then presumably bits of it might be organised
to compute functions outside of the class of Turing computable functions. Such a possibility
is known as hypercomputation[25]. A famous model was introduced by Hava Siegelmann[26]
( see the critique by Douglas[27]). There is also the interesting case of Malament-Hogarth
spacetimes[28] and Malament-Hogarth Machines[30]. A good analysis of the unlikely prospects
for hypercomputation can be found in Davis[29]
If the world does not obey the CTD principle than neither do causal agents as we have defined
them. This would open up a huge new class of possibilities for learning machines. Penrose[31]
has argued that the human brain is a good example of a physical system that does not obey the
CTD principle. We will simply assume that, for the causal agents we are discussing, the only
sensor inputs they receive can be regarded as the output of a Turing machine which takes the
actuator data as input.
Broadly speaking, causal relations between sensor and actuator records correspond to classes
of learnable functions that relate function inputs (actuator records) to function outputs (sensor
records), or symbolically S = f(A). In the presence of noise and error, the function is stochastic
and depends on additional uncorrelated noise variables, S = f(A,N). We first consider possible
constraints on the kind of function classes that the CA can learn.
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Recall that our CA are finite. As such, we require that the sample complexity (the number
of examples required to learn the causal relation in question) is bounded in some reasonable
manner. The framework of probably approximately correct learning (PAC) provides one avenue
to evaluating this task. Here one asks how many examples are required for the CA to find with
high probability (1− δ) an hypothesis (h) that will make no more than  errors on future unseen
examples. For relatively simple functions it is possible to determine directly if the function is
tractably learnable for a given number of samples m.
Let us consider a simple example. Imagine the function given by the world is the XOR
function. While XOR is an abstract Boolean function the device that implements it in the world
is a machine and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. A simple example is shown in
Fig.(6) This means errors, while possibly rare, will be inevitable. However the CA knows no
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Figure 6: A triple-well model of a XOR function built from a triple-well potential and the highly
dissipative motion of two particles. Each actuator applies a linear force with positive or negative
slope and records 1 or 0 respectively. If it records 00 and 11 the net force is zero and the
particles remain localised on either side of the origin providing the temperature is not too high.
If it applies either 01 or 10 a particle can leave its metastable localised state through thermal
fluctuations and fall down into the central well which represents the output of the XOR function.
The sensor detects the presence of a particle or not at the origin. Thermal fluctuations can lead
to an error in the function evaluation. Note also correct operation requires that the CA find the
system in the correct metastable state to begin with. This is not a state of thermal equilibrium.
If it is not in this state initially, the gate will also be in error.
more about this device than what it can learn from actuator and sensor records.
The CA uses a pair of actuators with four possible actions labeled by binary numbers (00,01,10
or 11). The sensor responds to the external system in two physically distinct ways and stores
the result in a single binary variable. If the XOR works perfectly the sensor records should be
perfectly correlated with the actuators record: a 0 for 00 or 11 and a 1 for 01 or 10. Let us assume
some reward is attached to the returning 1 signal. Can the CA learn the correct intervention to
efficiently bring about the reward?
The PAC learning of Boolean functions is discussed in [33]. To cast this into the PAC
framework we define our sample space as the set of four inputs (00,01,10,11), where the CA
aims to develop a hypothesis h that maps each example to either 0 or 1. There are 16 possible
Boolean functions of 2 variables: 22 = 4 possible inputs and in each case there are two possible
output values (1, 0), so the total number of functions is 42. The normal algebraic form for two
bit gates is f(x, y) = a⊕ b.x⊕ c.y⊕dx.y, where the parameters a, b, c, d are also binary variables.
For example XOR corresponds to b = c = 1, a = d = 0. These parameters label each of the
16 hypotheses. Although we desire that the hypothesis h should agree with the true function
(XOR) perfectly, we acknowledge that errors make perfect certainty unattainable.
Actuators and sensors are physical systems and as such are not immune from noise and error.
This will need to be kept low by constraining them to a low entropy environment. Even if
the actuators and sensors work almost perfectly we need to make some assumptions about the
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external world. Consider the example in Fig. (6). In order for the XOR function to be learned
as the correct description of this system it is necessary that the initial metastable state will
be encountered by the CA with high probability. The probability that this occurs depends on
temperature T of its environment and is proportional to e−βE with β = 1/kBT . If the triple-well
is too hot, almost every sensor record will be 1 independent of what the actuator does. This is
like an erasure error in communication theory. A single bit flip error in the actuator or sensor
record, or even in the physical device implementing the XOR, is equivalent to a single bit flip
error in the sensor record as XOR is associative.
Let the total probability of error be . If an error happens on a single trial the actuator/sensor
data will fit any one of the 15 wrong functions of two variables with probability . In a sequence
of N trials of actuator/sensor triples, the probability that every trial invalidates the hypothesis
XOR = True is bounded by (1−)N . We want to ensure this probability is less than some small
number δ. The basic result of PAC learning is that we need to ensure our data set is big enough
such that
N ≥ 1

(
ln
1
δ
+ ln 16
)
(16)
Then if the learning algorithm returns a hypothesis that is consistent with this many trials then,
with probability at least 1− δ, it has error at most .
While the PAC framework is useful in many contexts, there is an assumption that the number
of possible hypothesis for a given problem is finite (as in our example). Clearly, if we allow our
actuator/sensor records to range on a larger alphabet, perhaps some finite precision representa-
tion of real variables, this places ever greater physical demands on memory and operation and
may even cause one to doubt the role of real numbers in physics [34]. In such cases, PAC learn-
ing will no longer give us any guarantees. An alternative approach is the Vapnik Chervonenkis
dimension (VC)[35]. This gives an indication of the capacity of the learned hypothesis to classify
future answers to a set of intuitively relevant questions: (i) given a set of m labeled examples,
is there a consistent hypothesis? (ii) if we change labels, is there still a consistent hypothesis?
(iii) what is the largest m for which we can still produce a consistent hypothesis for which the
answer to (ii) is always “yes”? The answer is the VC dimension.
5.1 Learning two bit Boolean functions
We now give a simple model for a CA learning a two bit Boolean function. Let us suppose that
the CA has a Boolean function emulator that takes the actuator record in each trial, (xi, yi),
copies it and sends it to an internal emulator. The actuator settings can be randomly chosen at
first. The emulator computes the function f(xi, yi) = ai⊕bi.xi⊕ci.yi⊕dixi.yi where the control
parameters in the first trial are chosen randomly with equal probability. The CA now compares
the output of the emulator to the corresponding sensor record si returning from the world using
a comparator function C(xi, yi, si) = f(xi, yi) ⊕ si. If this is equal to zero, the function has
correctly given the required sensor record while if it is one it gives an error. Thus the output of
the comparator can be used as an error signal to feedback to the emulator and used to generate
another actuator setting. The emulator continues until the probability of error is reduced to
as small a value as possible. See Fig. (7. Once this is done the CA can be said to ‘have’ the
causal concept implicit in the primary actuator and sensor records when the agent interacts with
this particular kind of world. These internal representations may well be opaque to an outside
observer. In this sense the causal concepts, like sensor and actuator records, are perspectival.
Note that once the correct function in the external world is identified by the emulator,
f(x, y)⊕ s = s⊕ s = 0 for all actuator inputs. In other words the function c(x, y, s) = f(x, y)⊕ s
is a cost function and it is a minimum when the correct function is found; although this language
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Figure 7: A schematic of a learning machine based on a physical emulator with feedback. A
single round of learning proceeds as follows. The primary actuator record registers what action
is taken on the external world while the primary sensor record indicates what sensation is received
from the external world. The primary actuator record is copied and sent to an emulation engine
to produce an emulated sensor record. This is compared to the primary sensor record by a
comparator (C) and the result fed back to the emulation engine which then updates. A new
action is taken and the process repeats until some goal is met for the comparator output. The
feedback process and update may be a discrete time or continuous time stochastic process.
is not very appropriate when we only have binary values. The learning machine simply walks at
random through the function space until it finds the correct one and then it stops walking. In
the next section we will look more closely at the idea of minimising a cost function.
In reality errors compromise this learning protocol. It is no longer the case that when the
correct function has been found, f(x, y)⊕s = 0 for all actuator inputs. Errors can arise either in
the action of the external world, inside the agent or both. To describe errors in a Boolean function
we add an additional noise binary variable n so that the gate function becomes g(x, y, n) =
f(x, y) ⊕ n where n is a random binary variable such that the probability Pr(n = 1) = η is
the error probability. Now it is the case that s = f(x, y) ⊕ n. The agent will occasionally miss
the correct gate identification and continue its random walk. Clearly this will slow down the
learning.
If the agent has access to a large memory a different learning strategy can be implemented.
Once a large enough record of sensor actuator pairs has been accumulated, a conventional learning
algorithm can be implemented inside the agent, for example a nearest neighbour algorithm or
a neural network algorithm[13]. Errors will slow the learning and we can give a performance
measure in terms of the error probability that the correct gate is found. In Fig.(8) we plot the
probability for an external XOR gate to give the right output for input of (0, 1) versus error
probability using a Nearest Neighbour machine learning algorithm. As the error becomes more
probable the agent cannot learn as the external world is becoming a random number generator.
Agent learning requires that there be reliable structure in the external world if it is to learn.
Causal agents cannot function in a world that is in thermal equilibrium.
6 Thermodynamic constraints on learning causal relations.
We claim that a causal agent must be capable of learning and that the causal concepts implicit
in correlations between sensor and actuator data are stored in the learning machine. A learning
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Figure 8: The probability that Pr(0 ⊕ 1 = 1) versus the probability for a bit flip error in the
external gate.
machine is not a magic box. All learning algorithms must be implemented on a learning machine
(e.g. a neural net built from an array of GPUs or a Boolean function emulator built from
electronic circuits) and are thus subject to the laws of thermodynamics. The thermodynamics of
learning machines appears to be in its infancy so we will restrict this discussion to a few general
observations. Furthermore, we will consider only classical learning machines (i.e. not those that
use quantum coherence).
Following Goldt and Seifert[16] we will base our discussion on a particular kind of learning
machine, the perceptron. We will begin by describing a device that can take any number of
inputs but produces a single binary variable at output. Our model is based on the two-state
birth-death master equation system discussed in section (4) and is thus intrinsically stochastic.
Consider a single system with two states labeled with a single binary number y ∈ {0, 1}.
The dynamics is assumed to be stochastic and defined by the master equation Eq. (1) for the
occupation probabilities py We now use this model to define a perceptron[13], section 18.7.2. Let
the input data be a binary string of length n written as a vector ~x ∈ {0, 1}n. We now define a
perceptron by specifying how the parameter  (that biases the transition probabilities) depends
on binary inputs and weights,
(~x) = η
∑
k
wkxk (17)
where wk are the components of a unit vector ~w, that defines a point on the (n− 1)-sphere and
η > 0 is a gain parameter. These are the weights of the model. This means that || < ηh where
h is the Hamming weight of the vector ~x.
The output of the device is a single (stochastic) binary number y(t) with mean y¯(t) = p1(t).
Clearly y(t) is a random telegraph process as discussed in section (1). In the steady state this is
given by a sigmoidal function of (~x)
y¯ss =
1
1 + e(~x)
(18)
If we initialise the weights by a random unit vector then, with high probability,  = 0, the
steady state distribution is uniform and the entropy a maximum. The learning proceeds by
feeding back onto the ~w until p1(t) = 1 on correctly labeled training inputs ~xT . Clearly correct
labelling corresponds to the distribution shifting from uniform to highly non uniform in response
to these applied feedback forces. As we have seen this corresponds to the entropy decreasing
and the free energy increasing. Thus learning requires doing work on the system, by feedback,
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in such a way that the entropy decreases so that the free energy increases. Efficient learning
requires that we do work and decrease the entropy.
The stochastic differential equation for the observed output is
dy(t) = −(1− y(t))dN1(t) + y(t)dN0(t) (19)
where the point processes are defined by
E [dNy] = γe±(t)/2dt (20)
with + for y = 1 and − for y = 0, and
(t) = η ~w(t).~xT (21)
The feedback is thus defined by giving an equation of motion for ~w(t).
The cost function to be minimised is the error probability p0, i.e dp0(t) = 0. Using the
definition of the error probability
dp0(t) = −d~w(t).~∇wp0(t) (22)
an we see that the equation of motion for ~w(t) must be chosen in such a way that d~w(t) is parallel
to ~∇wp0(t) at every time t. Thus we define the learning rate L(t) by
d~w(t) = L(t)dt~∇wp0 (23)
As an example suppose we define the feedback update to (t) by
(t+ dt) = (t) + κdN0(t) (24)
where κ is the feedback strength. This protocol increases  by κ only if the system makes a
transition to the error state y = 0 and otherwise does nothing. It assumes that we have a fine-
grained observation of the process y(t) and can quickly respond to a transition 1→ 0. Thus the
(t) is a stochastic process that obeys the stochastic differential equation
d(t) = κdN0(t) (25)
If we average over the noise we see that the deterministic equation for (t) is
d(t)
dt
= κγe−(t)/2 (26)
with the solution
e(t)/2 = 1 + κγt/2 (27)
where we have assumed that (0) = 0. The master equation, averaged over the feedback is then
p˙0 = −γ(1 + κγt/2)p0 + γ
(1 + κγt/2)
p1 (28)
The solution for the error p0(t) for three values of κ is shown in Fig.(9). This control/learning
process implies that the weights obey the stochastic differential equation
d~w(t).~xT = (κ/η)dN0(t) (29)
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Figure 9: The error probability versus time for three different values of the feedback strength.
A stochastic control protocol for the learning rate. Using Eq. (23) we see that
ηL(t)dt
(
~∇wp0.~xT
)
= (κ/η)dN0(t) (30)
so that
κ = η
(
~∇wp0.~xT
)
(31)
and the learning rate is a stochastic point process given by
L(t)dt = dN0(t) (32)
The average learning rate is then
L¯(t) = γe−(t)/2 =
γ
1 + κγt/2
(33)
Stepping back it is clear that a learning machine is a driven non equilibrium system with a
highly non linear dynamics and many variables. Like all such systems it has non equilibrium
steady states and corresponding basins of attraction[37]. Once the machine has been trained,
new data sets fall into one or the other basin of attraction that encode features. In any case
like any non equilibrium steady state, such machines require a continual source of free energy
that lowers the entropy of the system. Betti and Gori[43] have made a good case for the inter-
pretation of learning as a physical dissipative process. It might be the case that in an open far
from equilibrium system of sufficient complexity the evolution of learning machines is a direct
consequence of thermodynamics and evolution[40, 41, 42] .
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Let us reprise the question of causal asymmetry in our approach and identify its ultimate origin.
Our claim is that causal relations are learned relations between sensor and actuator records
inside the CA. This is a complex feedback loop from sensors to actuators. There is a fundamental
thermodynamic asymmetry between these devices: actuators do work on the world and the world
does work on sensors.
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Of course for this to make sense there needs to be a boundary between the inside and outside
of the CA. This does not necessarily coincide with the spatial boundary of the CA. What is part
of a subsystem and what is part of the environment depends on spacetime and energy scales.
These are objective facts as described by the physics of the system involved. There may well be
systems inside the physical CA that are best treated as part of the environment; for example the
fluctuating forces that lead to noise in sensors and actuators. Such a boundary leads to a form
of perspectivalism. What is inside for one CA is outside for another.
CAs however are a rather special kind of open subsystem: they require access to a low
entropy source of energy (i.e. large free energy) in order for actuators, sensors and learning
to work realiably. This necessarily means that CAs are not in thermal equilibrium with their
environment. Why do such systems exist at all? Why isn’t every subsystem, no matter where
you draw the boundary, at thermodynamic equilibrium? The standard answer is the “Past
Hypothesis”[44].
From the external perspective the internal records of a CA are inaccessible by definition.
Consider an ensemble of CA-XOR gate pairs in the triple-well example in Fig.(6). From the
external perspective there are two kinds of systems interacting through the exchange of work
and heat. This interaction is irreversible. Given the inevitable errors in the CA actuators and
sensors, the final state of the XOR triple-well potential will fluctuate across the ensemble; its
entropy will increase. There is a temporal asymmetry in this process.
Form the internal perspective of the CA there is also a temporal asymmetry: increasing time
means increasing the size of the stored records. The temporal asymmetry is internally localised
but it is not dependent on the particular contingent contents of those accumulating records. It
is highly localised and it is necessarily aligned with a temporal arrow in the local environment
due to the thermodynamics of causal agents.
We have assumed that all data stored in memory is time series data. This requires us to
address the question of how the data is time-stamped. This does not require an external global
clock. As all memory records are internal to the machine it only needs an internal clock. One
solution is to make use of the generic phenomenon of self-oscillation and synchronisation which
arise naturally in open systems driven far from equilibrium[45, 46]. Indeed, all periodic clocks
are based on self-ocscillations in open dissipative non linear systems[47]. The beating heart is
an example in biology. A single internal self oscillation would suffice to provide an internal data
time-stamp.
Our account is explicitly interventionist due to the presence of actuators in a CA. Sensors
alone are not enough to build a CA. Certainly one could easily build a CA with an algorithm
to find patterns in its sensor records (a Bayesian network, say), especially with time series data
from multiple sensor types. It is easy to see that correlations could be found between records
from different types of sensors. For example a temperature sensor and a light sensor on a Mars
rover would show highly correlated periodic patterns. Would this correlation indicate a causal
relation? Such a claim would be open to Hume’s objection: patterns or ’regularities’ do not
ground causal claims. Changes in the temperature sensor record do not cause the changes in the
light sensor record.
In our presentation each CA encounters other CAs as simply another part of the world. A
given CA can only give a course-grained description of other CAs as their internal records are
unknown. (Of course this would change given a communication channel between CAs . . . a lan-
guage redraws the boundary of a CA to some extent). This coarse-grained description — the
‘external view’— is perfectly objective and consistent with the laws of thermodynamics. Like-
wise the internal view of a given CA is entirely objective as the contingent records it stores are
objective physical internal states that likewise obey the laws of thermodynamics. From the inter-
nal perspective, causation is asymmetric because sensors and actuators are thermodynamically
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asymmetric: there can be no ambiguity as to which system is which.
There is one respect in which our model of a causal agent is deficient2. Can an agent assign
a probability to its own actions? Phrased in terms of subjective probability, Liu and Price ask;
”Can an agent hold a meaningful credence about a contemplated action, as she deliberates?”[48].
Consider the example of an agent learning that the world implements an XOR gate (5.1 ). In
this example the agent can choose actions completely at random and the learning proceeds
mechanically to find the function that represents the causal relation between actuators and
sensors. The same is true for the abstract model in 6. In both these simple cases the probability
for an agent to choose an action, as assigned by a third party observer, is uniformly distributed
on the space of actions. It would be hard to claim that in this case actions are under the agent’s
control. Only the emulator’s response to actions is under the agents control and this might be
called deliberation. Clearly this is not what Ramsey[49] was getting at when he said “. In a
sense my present action is an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency.” Our model of a causal
agent is too simple to ground the concept of agential volition.
Let us contrast our position with that of Price [5] and the somewhat opposing views of
Woodward[50]. When discussing causation Price claims that there are four factors to consider
which we can summarise as:
(i) An action and its intended outcome are held to be related as cause and effect; means and
end are cause and effect.
(ii) There is a temporal asymmetry; causes typically precede their effects.
(iii) There is a temporal asymmetry in the application of cause-effect; users typically deliberate
about future actions of information received in the past.
(iv) Some temporal asymmetries in the environment, such as the prevailing thermodynamic
asymmetry.
He eventually concludes that these factors are best explained by the claim
B is an effect of A iff doing A is a means of bringing about B, from an agent’s
perspective —– roughly, if controlling A is a means of controlling B.
In our model A represents an actuator record while B represents a sensor record and the relation
between then is represented as a metastable state of the subsystem that does the learning. All
of these items are internal contingent states of a particular CA, and thus can be considered
perspectival.
Price acknowledges that his account of causation is an interventionist account but emphasises
“that the notion of intervention is ineliminably perspectival” [5]. He gives two arguments for
this. One, “The Reversibility Argument”, is based on a trying to imagine what would happen
if thermodynamic arrow is reversed in some part of the universe relative to the part that we
inhabit. In fact he calls this argument a ‘trump card’ for perspectivalism. The second argument
is based on answering the question “what is involved in deliberating or being an agent ?” We
believe our approach goes some way to answering this question.
In pursuit of the first argument, Price says “we need to distinguish ‘essential’ features of
deliberation from contingent facts about the temporal characteristics of deliberation in our case”.
Or, to put it differently, are there different kinds of deliberating agents from ourselves that also
have a different relation to time? For Price, “Deliberation seems to presuppose a personal or
subjective time for the deliberating agent herself, and in that time, the choices that comprise the
2Thank you to Huw Price for pointing this out and bringing Ramsey’s work to our attention
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relevant direct options certainly lie in the personal future—indeed, perhaps this is what ‘future’
should mean, in this context.” To which we can only reply, yes! In our model time for a CA is a
purely internal concept comprising an ordering of slowly accumulating memory records.
Returning to the example discussed in Fig(1), it is interesting to consider what happens if
time is reversed in the following sense; (i) sensors and actuators exchange roles, (ii) the distant
absorber becomes a particle emitting reservoir,(iii) the particle reservoir connected to the CA
becomes an absorber. It is remains the case that every low energy particle the agent emits is
returned but occasionally the agent receives a high energy particle from the distant emitter. The
learned correlation internal to the agent remains unchanged. As we have emphasised, causal
relations are learned relations between internal and contingent records representing physical
states of sensors and actuators. This only requires an internal clock not a global clock. We
speculate that no agent could deduce from its local learning experience which direction the
global time arrow flows. All that matters is the local arrow of time for a particular agent.
Woodward asserts that, He says[50],
Even when manipulations are carried out by human beings, it is the causal features of
those manipulations and not the fact that they are carried out by human beings or are
free or are attended by a special experience of agency that matters for recognizing and
characterizing causal relationships. Thus. . . [interventionism] avoids the . . . problem
besetting manipulability theories—that of anthropocentrism and commitment to a
privileged status for human action. There is nothing in the interventionist version
of a manipulability theory that commits us to the view that all causal claims are
in someway dependent for their truth on the existence of human beings or involve a
“projection” on to the world of our experience of agency.
Our approach shows that we can define causal relations independently of human agency, giving
a perspectival interventionist account that avoids the charge of anthropocentrism. Instead we
define causal relations as learned relations between internal physical states of a special kind of
open system, one with special physical subsystems: actuators, sensors and learning machines,
operating in an environment with access to a large amount of free energy. The physical states
inside a causal agent are no less physical than those in the world outside but they play a different
role.
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